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Abstract
The Grid and Web service community are defining a range of stan-
dards for a complete solution for security. The National e-Science Cen-
tre (NeSC) at the University of Glasgow is investigating how the vari-
ous pre-integration components work together in a variety of e-Science
projects. The EPSRC-funded nanoCMOS project aims to allow elec-
tronics designers and manufacturers to use e-Science technologies and
expertise to solve problems of device variability and its impact on sys-
tem design. To support the security requirements of nanoCMOS, two
NeSC projects (VPMan and OMII-SP) are providing tools to allow
easy configuration of security infrastructures, exploiting previous suc-
cessful projects using Shibboleth and PERMIS. This paper presents
the model in which these tools interoperate to provide secure and sim-
ple access to Grid resources for non-technical users.
Keywords: e-Science, Shibboleth, Grid, authentication, au-
thorisation
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1 Introduction
After years of consideration, the Grid community is now waking up to the
limitations of its current security models. Collaboration and sharing of re-
sources between e-Scientists has, up to now, been enabled by the creation of
custom user accounts on the machines in question, irrespective of location,
with access and protection given by X.509 digital certificates [1]. This in-
evitably leads to the situation where a user holds multiple user accounts on
separately administered resources. As the number of Grid users grows, this
decentralised model becomes unmanageable model and simply doesn’t scale.
The National e-Science Centre (NeSC) at the University of Glasgow has
focused on investigating tools to facilitate greater user uptake of Grid re-
sources. Experience gained through NeSC projects like BRIDGES [2] have
demonstrated that enticing novice users into adopting Public Key Infrastruc-
tures (PKIs) is at best difficult and at worst a severe risk. In general, the vast
majority of e-Researchers do not wish to be Grid researchers. With this in
mind, NeSC have worked primarily on development and deployment of por-
tal and browser based technologies. By making services available through
simple web interfaces, most of the complicated security interactions may be
hidden from the end user, thus guarding the services against malicious use.
This paper provides an overview of how the ‘back-end’ security models are
realised, hiding The Grid from e-Researchers and in turn making the over-
all system more usable and secure. The work draws on the results of several
JISC-funded UK e-Science projects at NeSC [3], including the GLASS project
(GLASgow early adoption of Shibboleth) [4] and the DyVOSE project (Dy-
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namic Virtual Organisations for e-Science Education)[5]. Two current NeSC
projects are aiming to extend these infrastructures to allow a complete se-
curity solution applicable to a wide variety of e-Research projects. The first
project OMII-SP, aims to provide a set of portlets which allow easy con-
figuration of portals exploiting Shibboleth and related security technologies.
The second, VPMan [6], is investigating integrating PERMIS and VOMS
(Virtual Organisation Membership Service) [7] to take advantage of the com-
plex features of the PERMIS authorisation decision engine along with the
flexibility and compatibility of VOMS attributes. The proof of any mid-
dleware, or security technologies generally, ultimately depends on how they
can be successfully applied. In this paper we focus on the security require-
ments of a major new e-Science project - “Meeting the Design Challenges of
nanoCMOS Electronics” and illustrate how Shibboleth combined with results
from the various NeSC security projects meets these requirements. All the
projects mentioned above utilise a common set of middleware, all of which
are designed to be generic solutions to the particular problems that they are
addressing.
2 Technologies
2.1 Shibboleth
Shibboleth [8] is an Internet2 project which implements a federated authen-
tication infrastructure currently based on SAML v1.1 [9], allowing a user’s
home login credentials to be valid across a federation of trusted sites. In the
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UK, the UKERNA Access Management Federation [10] provides a framework
for Higher Education and Further Education institutions to recognise each
others assertions of the identities of their own users. SAML (and therefore
Shibboleth) defines a set of entities which interact in order to achieve this
federated authentication model. A target or Service Provider (SP) repre-
sents a Shibboleth protected resource at a remote location and an origin or
Identity Provider (IdP) provides information about its local users. A third
entity, known as a Where Are You From (WAYF) service allows a user to
select which institution (IdP) they belong to before authenticating.
Shibboleth is highly configurable with regards to the amount of user infor-
mation that is disclosed to the federation. The individual entities keep track
of a particular login session through the use of a temporary, non-identifying
handle, effectively making identifying information optional within the SAML
framework. At the other extreme, SAML supports the eduPerson [11] schema
which allows a whole host of user information to be passed about. It is up
to individual institutions and/or the federation itself to set the requirements
for how much, or how little, disclosing information should be released to the
federation. SAML attributes may be used to present user entitlements or
privileges to providers, meaning that authorisation may be done using this
information and not simply based on an authentication assertion.
Finally, the persistence of the user login session coupled with a non-
identifying cookie means that Shibboleth may be used to implement a Single-
Sign On (SSO) system, where a single login at the IdP represents authen-
ticating to ALL services in the federation. As long as the browser window
remains open this session will persist, and logging out of Shibboleth is as
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easy as closing the browser window.
Considered from a Grid/e-Science paradigm, Virtual Organisations (VOs)
will require users to authenticate at their home institution and various VO-
specific attributes will be required to gain access to VO resources. Different
models for storage of these attributes are possible. In the federated model,
sites will support their own attribute authorities. In the centralised model
(and the most common in mainstream Grids) a VO-specific attribute author-
ity is established and used to define the roles and privileges for individuals
in that particular VO. VOMS is often used for this very purpose - with an
SP using these VO-specific attributes to make VO-specific authorisation de-
cisions. One generic technology which enables all of the above models is
PERMIS which may be used to protect nearly any kind of resource, and
naturally has the ability to protect Grid resources running, for example, the
Globus Toolkit.
2.2 PERMIS
PERMIS (Privilege and Role Management Infrastructure Standards Valida-
tion) is a set of software tools which allow Privilege Management Infrastruc-
tures (PMIs) [12] to be created which implement the X.812 generic autho-
risation framework [13]. The suite consists of a number of services which
enable the issuance and maintenance of user credentials, the creation and
enforcement of local security policies, and the interfacing of the PMI with
numerous middleware and network services. PERMIS credentials take the
form of X.509 Attribute Certificates (ACs) in which extra information about
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the user’s privileges on resources is stored. These privileges are usually ex-
pressed in the form of user roles within a VO, so method-level Role Based
Access Control (RBAC) [14] may be used to secure access to resources. The
ACs issued to users are digitally signed by an Attribute Certificate Manager
(ACM) tool to prevent tampering, and may be loaded into an LDAP server
or database so the user need not ever have to handle the certificate them-
selves. The privilege information contained within the AC typically refers
to the user’s role in an VO (e.g. ‘student’, ‘administrator’, ‘consultant’),
with the meaning of these roles being defined in the local VO-specific secu-
rity policy. This policy is written by the resource or VO administrator, and
contains complete information about the actions that may be performed on
their resource, and the roles that are required to be held by a user in order to
perform that action. The policy is also digitally signed and typically loaded
into the administrator or ‘Source of Authority’ (SoA) entry in the LDAP
server.
There exists a set of advanced tools for setting up PMIs with PERMIS.
A Secure Audit Web Service [15] is available which allows a complete record
of an institution’s attribute use to be collated. This is useful for permanent
records, but also to allow so-called ‘Separation of Duty’ checks to be made,
where a user may be restricted in asserting attributes with conflicting privi-
leges (e.g. being a ‘student’ AND an ‘assessor’ in the same examination).
The PERMIS Delegation Issuing Service (DIS) is a Web Service which
is used to issue ACs to users. The DIS offers a number of advantages over
the normal certificate issuing tool (ACM). The first being that any AC is-
suance is checked against the local XML security policy, meaning that ONLY
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valid ACs can ever be issued. The second and most powerful feature is that
it implements Dynamic Delegation of Authority, where the privilege to as-
sign attributes (and issue ACs) relevant for access to a local resource may
be delegated safely to subordinate users in your institution or to remote
trusted individuals at remote institutions. This is effectively done by the
administrator issuing a Role Allocation Policy (RAP) to the delegated user,
which specifies which attribute(s) they may assign, their timescale, and also
whether or not this delegated user may delegate the ability to assign these
attributes even further down the chain. In a normal PKI chain of trust,
this model runs into problems if an intermediate user has their signing key
revoked, causing any ACs they signed to become invalid even though the
privilege they granted is correctly assigned and still valid. The DIS avoids
this issue by signing the certificate using its own PKI key-pair on behalf of
the delegating user, so the removal of a rogue user who has issued an AC
to a subordinate will not affect the validity of the AC because the AC was
never signed by the rogue user - it was only issued by them, in accordance
with the local policy.
Through DIS, the concept of dynamic delegation can be extended across
institutions, effectively merging the capabilities of distinct PMIs. By recog-
nising a collaborating institution’s authority to sign attributes, the RAPs can
be handed to any PMI, allowing attributes required for access to non-local
services to be stored at the user’s home institution. The credentials may also
be stored at the resource side as well, although this will require an entry for
the home user in the remote LDAP which may not be possible.
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3 Scenarios
At NeSC we operate our own Shibboleth Identity Provider, which extracts
static identifying information about its users (common name, jpegPhoto,
organisation etc) from a central LDAP server. In the GLASS project, we are
working with University IT Services to provide campus-wide authentication
of students and staff. This is based on the roll-out of the Novell Nsure account
management system, which will register all valid staff and students on their
centrally managed LDAP-based database, and will involve the issuance of a
unique ‘uid’ to each member which may be used to uniquely identify them
within the institution. Since VO-specific authorisation attributes required
to access local and remote resources are unlikely to be stored in a central
LDAP, we have utilised the JNDI connectors in the Shibboleth attribute
resolver to search multiple LDAP servers (departments) for user attributes.
So, providing the departmental LDAP can link a user entry to the central
LDAP via the unique ‘uid’ attribute, the department itself can issue the roles
required for access to their own resources without having to go through some
centralised attribute assigning process. Indeed this assigning needs no special
software, just a normal LDAP browser is enough to assign these attribute
strings. Figure 1 shows the interactions necessary to extract a complete
campus attribute set.
Since the authentication step is performed at the central LDAP server,
no matter how many attributes the user holds in each department, if the
user’s privileges are removed - for example, if they leave the university having
graduated (or having been thrown out!) they can no longer assert their
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Figure 1: A schematic of distributed Attribute Authorities within a single
institutional Identity Provider. Note that the attribute set that the IdP
asserts is the union of the two departmental AAs.
identity in the federation and their attributes are not available for access.
Distributed attributes within the domain of a single IdP is an ideal solution
for campus level access control and single sign-on, however when dealing
with a federation of IdPs there needs to be someway of assigning and also
restricting the attribute set that visible to Service Providers. The assigning
of attributes will probably involve a solution either outside of Shibboleth
or integration with external applications. Restricting the attribute set seen
by an SP are one of the goals of the OMII-SP Project. The OMII-UK [16]
institute is aiming to provide a set of supported tools which will allow UK
e-Science projects to share software and experience.
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We note that these technologies are not directly dependent on the Grid
middleware. The OMII-SP project is targeted to protection of OMII services,
but the acceptance and restriction of VO-specific attributes can be equally
applied to Globus services, for example, or Web Services more generally.
4 OMII Portal Services
One of the problems with joining a large Shibboleth federation of collab-
orating sites is that by agreeing to recognise the authentication assertions
of remote institutions, without careful configuration you may find your re-
sources are accessible by a far greater user set than you initially had intended.
Indeed, with the out-of-the-box Shibboleth installation not using attributes
for authorisation decisions, anyone within the federation who has success-
fully authenticated may access any Shibboleth protected resource within the
federation. To counteract this, the use of Shibboleth SAML attributes can
allow role-based access control to be enforced. However, if the attribute re-
quired for access is discovered by another institution outwith the collabora-
tion, they may be able to present that attribute within their valid Shibboleth
session and gain access. A simple way to prevent this is to utilise attribute
scoping, where an attribute has additional location identifying information
appended to it making it globally unique. For example, in the eduPerson
schema, there is an attribute eduPersonTargetedID which is intended to be
a locally unique, non-identifying attribute used for stateful services to retain
profiles for returning users. If by accident two institutions assign the same
eduPersonTargetedID to different users, then access to the other users de-
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tails may become possible. Scoping the eduPersonTargetedID attribute can
be done by appending the domain of the Identity Provider to the attribute.
For example, if a user from Glasgow had the unscoped eduPersonTargetedID
of ‘652425437’, the scoped attribute would be ‘652425437@gla.ac.uk’. This
scoped value makes the locally unique unscoped attribute globally unique
within the federation, guaranteeing it only refers to one person, a good anal-
ogy being the uniqueness of standard email addresses.
For Service Providers, it is important that one can discriminate between
an institution you trust to assert your attribute and one that you only wish
to trust the authentication assertions of its own users. In Shibboleth, this
distinction is made by altering the Attribute Acceptance Policy (AAP). The
AAP lists which attributes are accepted by the Service Provider, and from
which sites these attributes will be trusted. Direct editing of the AAP is not
trivial, and an error in the syntax could compromise the Service Provider.
Within the OMII-UK framework, the NeSC OMII-SP project is devel-
oping a family of JSR-168 compliant portlets that may be deployed in an
environment like GridSphere. The first of these allows correct editing of
the AAP using a intuitive GUI. It is worth noting a similar tool exists for
editing of Identity Provider Attribute Release Policies called ShARPE [17].
Figure 2 shows the SCAMP (SCoped Attribute Manager Portlet) portlet
interface, where trusted sites may be added or removed, and the form of
the incoming attributes may be checked/scoped. For example, a particular
VO like nanoCMOS may only wish to accept attributes which begin with
‘nanoCMOS ’. The portlet would normally only be accessible to the site ad-
ministrator or a trusted delegate, and this access control can be enforced by
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Figure 2: The SCoped Attribute Manager Portlet (SCAMP)
another Shibboleth attribute. On pressing the ‘publish’ button, the portlet
commits this policy to the Shibboleth installation, and any new login sessions
would be bound by the new rules. The software is currently at the testing
phase, prior to adoption by the OMII Middleware group.
5 The nanoCMOS Project
The UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) Project
nanoCMOS [18] is a collaboration between academia, leading electronics de-
sign houses, vendors and manufacturers to apply the knowledge of the e-
Science community to some of the fundamental problems facing nanoCMOS
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design [19]. In particular, the impact of transistor variability on overall cir-
cuit designs is a fundamental issue for the semiconductor industry for the
next decade. The project is investigating the use of e-Science technology
to allow geographically separated collaborators to interact with the overall
design chain, with security for the intellectual property of the collaborating
industrial partners a major priority.
The Grid jobs will be submitted to resources such as the National Grid
Service [20] or more local resources like ScotGRID [21]. Authentication is
levered primarily by X.509 proxy certificates, issued by the UK e-Science
Certificate Authority [22], with authorisation done either through the use of
gridmap files, or using VOMS attributes appended to the proxy certificate.
Also in use in the UK is MyProxy [23] which allows a central repository
to issue proxy certificates to its registered users. The widespread use of
these current systems in the UK mean that any security solution will have
to accommodate some if not all of them.
The first issue that needs to be resolved is the position of Shibboleth in
this infrastructure. Shibboleth is an excellent SSO solution that allows fed-
erated authentication, but for institutional level IdPs, without some way of
loading attributes intended for fine-grained access to external systems into
the local IdP (or other attribute authority) it would only be possible to hold
attributes intended for local access. In a distributed collaborative environ-
ment this is unworkable. However, if the Shibboleth attributes are consid-
ered only a part of the authorisation process, then these locally assigned
attributes may be used to gain initial access to remote resources. So using
the multi-Attribute Authority scenario described in the section above, a user
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Figure 3: A diagram showing the interactions of the separate infrastructures
within the nanoCMOS project.
who requires access to the front nanoCMOS page for which a ‘nanoCMOS’
attribute is required would visit their home department administrator who
would load this attribute into their LDAP server. The attribute combined
with the successful authentication would be enough to get an initial view of
the page, but any actions on that page would be protected by further required
credentials such as ACs. If these attributes are only for coarse-grained access
control then institutions are less likely to refuse to distribute them across the
federation, indeed they may be adopted as standard attributes in the same
way as eduPersonAffiliation - so when a project receives funding it could
be allocated an eduPersonEntitlement value that the relevant departments
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within institutions may load into their local LDAP servers for each of the
required users. This value could be a simple text name, or could be a hash
or encrypted value to make it less revealing.
Figure 3 shows the interaction of the various components in the project.
Once Shibboleth authenticated, an attribute-filtered view of the portal shows
the services available to the user. At this point the user will need to invoke
some Grid credentials to run jobs on external resources, in the UK this is a
X.509 proxy certificate. MyProxy allows a user to activate a proxy certificate
without passing the original certificate around. The username and password
required may be input manually open login, or can be transported as a scoped
Shibboleth attribute. The VOMS service allows the user to request a cer-
tificate asserting certain role/membership values, and these VOMS-specific
attributes are appended to a user’s X.509 credential. These values may be
manually requested by the user, or they may also be extracted from local
Shibboleth attributes. These credentials are recognised by the National Grid
Service, so may be used to extract any other credentials that they demand
for authorisation. These credentials may be used to map users into the cor-
rect environment for their project. This model can be applied to any major
e-Science project utilising access to large-scale Grid resources.
6 Summary
NeSC have combined experiences of several of their projects to enable a secu-
rity solution for the nanoCMOS project. This involves a Shibboleth Identity
Provider which acts as an institutional level authentication mechanism based
15
on the GLASS project, which extracts service-specific user attributes from
Attribute Authorities hosted at various departments on campus - a model
which enables departmental project-level control of user attributes, but cam-
pus wide control of authentication assertions. This information is used to
tailor a portal view that represents the user’s abilities or privileges on the
project portal, with the SCAMP portlet from the OMII-Portlets project be-
ing used to scope incoming attributes to ensure resources are only being
requested from the correct institution. Finally the VPMan project is investi-
gating proposed standards to allow a portal to use the DN information from
Shibboleth to extract credentials from a VOMS server, and use the PERMIS
decision engine to authorise access using these attributes, or to extract its own
PERMIS Attribute Certificates which may have been dynamically delegated
across institutions. This work demonstrates several standard Grid security
solutions working together to allow easy and secure access to resources un-
til a complete international standard has been defined. We note that these
technologies are being applied across a range of e-Research projects at NeSC
including clinical trials, epidemiological studies, bioinformatics amongst nu-
merous others. Through exploiting the browser-based SSO of Shibboleth,
e-Researchers can now ‘roam’ across different VOs, with the pushing and
pulling of the attributes required for authorisation completely hidden from
the end users (as are the authorisation decisions themselves). In essence,
these security technologies provide the glue that allows interdisciplinary re-
search to be conducted in a seamless and transparent manner. Finally we
note that the SCAMP portlet is the first of several to be produced in the
OMII-SP project, with attribute push and release portlets being developed.
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Our ultimate goal is to make establishment and use of security-oriented e-
Infrastructure easy and manageable for future VOs, admins and end-users
alike.
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